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101 
REASONABLY  PREDICTABLE: THE 
RELUCTANCE TO EMBRACE JUDICIAL 





In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) are no longer mandatory.1  Even so, 
in its remedial opinion, the Booker Court instructed sentencing courts to 
continue to consult the Guidelines2 and instructed appellate judges to con-
sider the reasonableness of the lower court’s sentences.3  As a result of this 
recent decision, there has been a flurry of speculation within academia and 
the blogosphere about the extent of federal judicial discretion in determin-
ing sentences.4
Because Booker created an advisory sentencing regime,
 
5 there is much 
guesswork regarding how much influence the Guidelines should retain.6  
While judges must consult the Guidelines and use them as a basis for calcu-
lating sentences,7
                                                          
* Fordham Law School, J.D. candidate 2007, Emory University, B.A. 2003.  I am grateful 
to Judge John Gleeson for sparking my interest in this topic and suggesting its importance; 
to Professor Ian Weinstein for providing feedback and guidance as I began this endeavor; 
and to my husband, family, and friends for supporting me through this process. 
 it is unclear to what extent they should be able to diverge 
 1. 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005) (excising the provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines that created a mandatory sentencing scheme). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 260-63. 
 4. E.g., Robert Weisberg & Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Lessons, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(2005); Posting of PG to de novo, http://www.blogdenovo.org/archives/2005_01.html (Jan. 
12, 2005, 14:36 EST).  See generally Sentencing Law and Policy, 
http://sentencing.typepad.com (last visited Sept. 26, 2006). 
 5. 543 U.S. at 259. 
 6. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 7. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264; see also United States v. Martin, 135 F. App’x 411, 414-15 
(11th Cir. 2005) (noting that judges must consult the Guidelines and state their reasons for 
imposing a sentence). 
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from the Guidelines and impose sentences that are lesser or higher than the 
Guidelines sentence.8
Within the realm of expanded judicial discretion are sentence reductions 
due to a defendant’s cooperation with the government, namely, where there 
are no statutory mandatory minimums.
 
9  Cooperation is one of several 
bases for sentencing departures.  Prior to Booker, judges had discretion to 
depart from the Guidelines where the government made a section 5K1.1 
motion after receiving substantial assistance, or cooperation, from a defen-
dant.10 Post-Booker cooperation departures are particularly fascinating be-
cause they are a clear illustration of the manner in which Booker may ex-
pand a judge’s power to “do what’s right,”11
                                                          
 8. Booker emphasizes the need for judges to make “individualized sentences,” howev-
er, it is not very clear how much discretion judges have to achieve this goal.  See Booker, 
543 U.S. at 264-65 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) in stating that the Guidelines should 
encourage uniformity while allowing flexibility for individualized sentences where neces-
sary).  The extent of judicial “flexibility” is not very clear.  Thus, post-Booker commenta-
tors have speculated about how Booker will continue to impact sentencings.  See, e.g., supra 
note 4 and accompanying text. 
 while simultaneously limiting 
a prosecutor’s discretion by allowing the judge to depart from the Guide-
 9. It has been generally accepted that Booker does not apply where Congress has im-
posed a statutory mandatory minimum sentence; thus, the breadth of Booker’s impact is li-
mited to the Guidelines and not to federal statutes that require mandatory minimums.  Harris 
v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 567-68 (2002); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 
(1986) (holding that the legislature may create statutory minimums without violating the 
Constitution). 
 10. The section 5K1.1 provision states: 
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substan-
tial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has com-
mitted an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines. 
(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons 
stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following: 
(1) the court’s evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the de-
fendant’s assistance, taking into consideration the government’s evalua-
tion of the assistance rendered; 
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or 
testimony provided by the defendant; 
(3) the nature and extent of the defendant’s assistance; 
(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant 
or his family resulting from his assistance; 
(5) the timeliness of the defendant’s assistance. 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2005). 
 11. See, e.g., Posting of TChris to TalkLeft: The Politics of Crime,  
http://talkleft.com/new_archives/009332.html (Jan. 15, 2005) (claiming that the “judge’s 
discretion to impose the sentence the judge deems ‘just’ has expanded”).  But see United 
States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1033-34 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the district court can-
not exercise an “extraordinary reduction” in imposing a sentence absent “extraordinary cir-
cumstances”). 
GERONIMO_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:20 PM 
2006] “REASONABLY PREDICTABLE”  103 
lines without a motion from the government.12  As this Comment illustrates, 
however, most appellate courts are reluctant to affirm sentences where the 
district court judge has exercised this discretion in the context of coopera-
tion departures.13  The majority of courts have either failed to analyze how 
Booker impacts the mechanics of section 5K1.1 cooperation departures,14 
or failed to address the question.15  Appellate courts have been particularly 
reluctant to affirm sentences where the sentence is lower than that which is 
recommended under the Guidelines.16
                                                          
 12. See Laurie P. Cohen & Gary Fields, Balance of Power: High Court Declares Guide-
lines on Sentencing Violate Rights, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2005, at A1 (suggesting that creat-
ing an advisory system eliminates the prosecutor’s power to seduce the defendant into coo-
perating).  Later, in comments posted to a sentencing policy blog, Professor Frank Bowman 
added the following:  
  Nonetheless, several courts have 
Booker insofar as it apparently eliminates, moots, or at least renders less important 
the government monopoly on substantial assistance motions while at the same 
time giving judges a much broader degree of sentencing discretion generally.  
That represents a change disadvantageous to the gov’t in what working prosecu-
tors have always regarded as one of the most important features of the guidelines.   
See Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com (Jan. 13, 2005, 13:34 EST). 
 13. See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that absent a government section 5K1.1 motion, the district court cannot grant a substantial 
assistance departure).  The court supported its conclusion that there must be a government 
motion to depart by citing a pre-Booker case.  Id. (citing United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 
1492, 1499 (11th Cir. 1993)).  In Crawford, the court fails to explain why the advisory na-
ture of the Guidelines does not impact the section 5K1.1 provision, nor does the court at-
tempt to explain why a pre-Booker case would be relevant in the post-Booker advisory sys-
tem.  Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See United States v. Doe, 398 F.3d 1254, 1260 n.7 (10th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that 
pre-Booker, a government motion was necessary for the district court to grant a downward 
departure, but electing not to evaluate the “continued vitality” of this requirement in an ad-
visory sentencing regime). 
 16. See, e.g., United States v. Desselle, 450 F.3d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 2006) (vacating a 
substantial assistance departure that was greater than the sentence that was recommended by 
the prosecution); United States v. Fairclough, 439 F.3d 76, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming a 
sentence where the district court diverged from the Sentencing Guidelines by imposing a 
high sentence on the defendant); United States v. Goody, 442 F.3d 1132, 1134 (8th Cir. 
2006) (vacating a sentence where the district court gave a sentence that was lower than the 
Guidelines sentence, finding that there were no extraordinary circumstances to warrant the 
divergence).  Professor Berman notes the trend to reverse sentencing variances that decrease 
a defendant’s sentences, and to affirm sentences that increase the defendant’s sentences.  
Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com/ (June 18, 2006, 00:09 EST).  
When listing recent published circuit court cases that deal with sentencing, Professor Ber-
man noted that as of March 31, 2006, there were seventeen cases reversed for unreasonable-
ness when the district court diverged from the Guidelines to grant a lower sentence.  Sen-
tencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com/ (Mar. 31, 2006, 15:22 EST).  Only 
one sentence was reversed, however, where the district court granted a sentence that was 
higher than the Guidelines sentence.  Id.  Even more disturbing are the eleven higher 
(above-guideline) sentences that were affirmed in comparison to the two below-guideline 
sentences that were affirmed.  Id.  Although Professor Berman’s study does not list all re-
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used 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the statute describing offender characteristics 
that judges should consider at sentencing, as a mechanism for granting sen-
tences below the Guidelines to account for an offender’s cooperation.17
This Comment focuses on the nuances of post-Booker cooperation de-
partures and sentence variances.  Section 5K1.1 of the Guidelines governs 
the provision of cooperation, or substantial assistance, departures.
 
18  This 
provision was the primary method for defendants to receive cooperation 
departures prior to Booker.19  The section 5K1.1 provision allowed substan-
tial assistance departures where the prosecution actually benefited from the 
defendant’s cooperation.20
First, Part I.A of this Comment will provide an overview of the original 
goals of the Sentencing Commission and the section 5K1.1 substantial as-
sistance provision.  Part I.B of the Comment summarizes United States v. 
Booker and its impact on cooperation departures.  Finally, post-Booker ap-
plication of section 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to substantial assistance 
is explored in Part II and is followed by a recommendation in Part III.  This 
Comment argues that judges should not only consider a defendant’s coop-
eration with the government at sentencing, but they should also consider 
those efforts where the cooperation does not amount to substantial assis-
tance. 
  This Comment discusses how this aspect of the 
substantial assistance provision has been implicated by expanded judicial 
discretion. 
                                                                                                                                      
cent cases, it does illustrate a general trend to treat upward variances and downward va-
riances differently.  Id.  As noted by the Second Circuit, reasonableness is a flexible stan-
dard.  See United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (“‘[R]easonableness’ is 
inherently a concept of flexible meaning, generally lacking precise 
boundaries . . . .”).  That does not mean, however, that it should be applied inconsistently 
based on whether the divergence is upward or downward. 
 17. E.g., United States v. Beamon, 373 F. Supp. 2d 878, 884-86 (E.D. Wis. 2005); Unit-
ed States v. Condon, Nos. C3-05-04, C3-05-05, 2005 WL 1114841 (D.N.D. Apr. 22, 2005); 
see also AMY BARON-EVANS, FED. PUB. & CMTY. DEFENDERS, SENTENCING POST-BOOKER 15 
(2005), available at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/sentencing%20postbooker101205.pdf.  See 
infra note 70 for the text of § 3553(a). 
 18. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  Within the Guidelines, the section 5K1.1 
provision had a monopoly over substantial assistance departures.  Although defendants 
could receive a sentence reduction for “accepting responsibility” for their actions, this de-
parture is generally lesser than the departure for substantial assistance.  U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2005).  Furthermore, offenders who provide or make a good 
faith effort to provide substantial assistance to the government do more than accept respon-
sibility for their actions.  See infra Part III.A. 
 19. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 20. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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PART I: FEDERAL SENTENCING AND BOOKER 
A.  The Sentencing Guidelines and Section 5K1.1 
The Guidelines came into effect in 1989 and provided mandatory sen-
tencing guidelines for federal offenders.21  The Sentencing Commission 
Report of 1991, which described the goals of the Guidelines, identified six 
objectives for mandatory sentences: “assuring ‘just’ [] punishment, more 
effective deterrence, more effective incapacitation of the serious offender, 
elimination of sentence disparities, stronger inducements for knowledgea-
ble offenders to cooperate in the investigation of others, and judicial econ-
omies resulting from increased pressure on defendants to plead guilty.”22
Section 5K1.1 of the Guidelines provided for a departure from the man-
datory sentence where the defendant provided substantial assistance to the 
prosecution.
 
23  Defendants had to actually provide substantial assistance to 
the government in order to benefit from this departure.24  In other words, 
the cooperation was required to result in increased prosecution and further 
the prosecutorial enterprise before the defendant would receive the benefit 
of a reduced sentence.  The provision of a sentencing departure is initiated 
by a government motion requesting a sentence reduction due to the defen-
dant’s cooperation with the prosecution.25  In some courts, the government 
provides the judge with a suggested sentencing range based on the extent of 
the defendant’s cooperation, timeliness of cooperation, and other related 
factors.26  The sentence reduction for substantial assistance can provide a 
multiple-level departure from the Guidelines.27
                                                          
 21. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 376-69 (1989). 
  As a result, the section 
 22. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
199, 201-02 (1993) (citing to U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES 
IN THE FEDERAL & CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 13-15 
(1991)) . 
 23. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 24. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 25. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005).  The 
practice of the government suggesting what sentence the judge should provide is not com-
mon to all jurisdictions.  Some courts may place more weight on the probation office’s sug-
gestion, and still, in other courts, the prosecutor makes no suggestion about sentences.  For 
practical reasons, this Comment focuses on the courts where the government’s suggestion is 
usually given great weight.  In other jurisdictions, the government is not likely to appeal the 
sentencing decision of the judge.  Thus, there is limited case law discussing the reasonable-
ness of the trial court’s decisions.  Although prosecutors have greater control over the sen-
tencing in these circuits, the appellate decisions on reasonableness still offer insight for oth-
er jurisdictions. 
 27. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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5K1.1 provision can significantly reduce the defendant’s sentence.28  Many 
critics of the section 5K1.1 provision argue that it provides the prosecutor 
with too much discretion.29  The judge, however, has the discretion to grant 
or deny the government’s section 5K1.1 motion.30  Thus, the section 5K1.1 
departure requires agreement between the prosecutor and the judge.31
The original version of the section 5K1.1 provision granted substantial 
assistance departures where defendants made a good faith effort to coope-
rate with the prosecution.
 
32  In 1989, however, the Sentencing Commission 
amended the section 5K1.1 provision, requiring that substantial assistance 
be actually provided.33  The Sentencing Commission claimed that this 
amendment was a clarification of the original provision.34
This change is significant because it required actual provision of sub-
stantial assistance and did not consider a good faith effort to provide sub-
stantial assistance for a sentencing departure.
 
35  The Sentencing Commis-
sion stated that the original language suggested that the attempt to 
cooperate with the government would warrant a departure.36  The original 
language, however, required a “good faith effort” to provide substantial as-
sistance, not a mere desire to do so.37
                                                          
 28. See supra note 
  Thus, this “clarification” between a 
good faith effort to provide and actual provision of substantial assistance, 
in reality, seems to have been a substantial change to the Guidelines, and 
not a mere “clarification.”  Furthermore, as a result of this change, prosecu-
tors focused on the actual fruits of the information that defendants pro-
16 and accompanying text; see also Linda Drazga Maxfield & John 
H. Kramer, Substantial Assistance: An Empirical Yardstick Gauging Equity in Current Fed-
eral Policy and Practice, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 6, 13 (1998) (“The court’s role in the sub-
stantial assistance process is to decide whether to accept the prosecution’s § 5K1.1 motion 
and, if so, to determine the magnitude of departure as a function of the degree and nature of 
the cooperation.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Conse-
quences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 662-63 (2004). 
 30. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2005). 
 31. See id. 
 32. The original provision stated, “Upon motion of the government stating that the de-
fendant has made a good faith effort to provide substantial assistance in the investigation or 
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the 
guidelines.”  Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,103 (May 13, 
1987) (emphasis added). 
 33. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (amended 1989). 
 34. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 
MANUAL 115-16 (Apr. 13, 1987) (incorporating technical, clarifying, or conforming 
amendments submitted to Congress May 1, 1987), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/2001guid/Appc-5.pdf. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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vided, rather than the offender characteristics that substantial assistance 
demonstrates.38
B. Summary of United States v. Booker 
 
In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court held that the Guidelines 
were only advisory.39  The Court issued both a doctrinal opinion, written by 
Justice Stevens, and a remedial opinion, written by Justice Breyer.40  In its 
remedial opinion, the Supreme Court required that judges consult the 
Guidelines, even though they are not bound by them.41  The Booker Court 
struck down § 3553(b) of the federal sentencing statute, which required 
courts to impose sentences within the Guidelines.42
The facts of the case follow.  Based on the results of the jury trial, Res-
pondent Booker received a sentence between 210 and 262 months in prison 
under the Guidelines.
 
43  Despite this, the district court judge held a post-
sentencing hearing and determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that Booker could be held accountable for an additional 566 grams of co-
caine for sentencing purposes.44  This finding increased Booker’s sentence 
to one between 360 months and life imprisonment.45
In addition, Respondent Fanfan, the second defendant to the case, was 
convicted of a crime that placed his sentence at seventy-eight months under 
the Guidelines.
 
46  During a sentencing hearing following the trial, the judge 
found additional facts that raised Fanfan’s sentence to a sentence between 
188 and 235 months.47




                                                          
 38. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2005) (instructing the judge to 
evaluate the actual provision of substantial assistance).  The distinction between actually 
reaping the benefits from the defendant’s cooperation versus considering the good faith ef-
forts to cooperate quickly, and with as much information as possible, is critical.  The former 
only evaluates whether prosecutors were able to prosecute using the defendant’s informa-
tion.  Thus, where two defendants provide the same information, only one has provided sub-
stantial assistance to the prosecution because the prosecution has not “actually” benefited 
from the second individual’s information. 
  Under the Sixth Amendment, defendants have a right 
 39. 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005). 
 40. Id. at 226, 244. 
 41. Id. at 259. 
 42. Id. at 245.  Section 3553(b) is codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (West Supp. 
2004). 
 43. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 228. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 226. 
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to a fair jury trial.49  The common law incorporates the right to be proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt into the nexus of Sixth Amendment 
rights.50  Under the mandatory system, both Booker’s and Fanfan’s Sixth 
Amendment rights were violated because the Guidelines allowed judicial 
fact-finding under a “preponderance of the evidence” standard.51  The 
Booker Court noted that if the Guidelines were advisory, this problem 
would not exist.52  Under an advisory sentencing system, the judge can as-
sess the factors she finds most relevant without a finding from the jury, dis-
tinguishing it from the mandatory fact-finding under the mandatory sen-
tencing scheme.53  The Court noted the previous legislative scheme 
allowed judges to make certain factual findings and grant sentence en-
hancements as an aggravating factor interfering with the offenders’ Sixth 
Amendment rights.54  As a result of this practice, the judge, not the jury, 
became the main fact-finder whose decision impacted the defendant.55
The doctrinal opinion concluded that under a mandatory sentencing re-
gime, fact-finding that increased the sentence of the defendant must be 
brought before the jury.
 
56  The Booker Court held that despite the efficien-
cy issues that may arise, any judicial fact-finding that enhanced the defen-
dant’s sentence, based on her plea of guilty or a jury verdict, must be sub-
mitted to the jury in order to preserve the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights.57  The Court reasoned that the rights embodied by the Sixth 
Amendment outweigh the interests of efficiency and held that the Guide-
lines, as they stood, were unconstitutional.58
In the remedial opinion written by Justice Breyer, the Court discussed 
the construction of the Guidelines after the doctrinal holding that the 
Guidelines were unconstitutional.
 
59  The Court corrected the constitutional 
infirmities of the Guidelines by severing two provisions.60
                                                          
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
  The Court 
struck down § 3553(b)(1), which created the mandatory nature of the 
 50. Booker, 543 U.S. at 230. 
 51. Id. at 232. 
 52. Id. at 233. 
 53. Id. (“For when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence 
within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that 
the judge deems relevant.”). 
 54. Id. at 236 (“As the enhancements became greater, the jury’s finding of the underly-
ing crime became less significant.”). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 244. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 243-44. 
 59. Id. at 244. 
 60. Id. at 259. 
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Guidelines, as well as § 3742(e), which set the standard of appellate review 
for sentences.61  The Court held that severing these provisions preserved 
the constitutionality of the remaining provisions of the Guidelines.62  The 
Court also held that this action effectively rendered the Guidelines advi-
sory.63  The Court then instructed judges to continue to consult the Guide-
lines when sentencing,64 but it also permitted judges to tailor the sentences 
to satisfy statutory concerns, citing § 3553(a).65
Several policy considerations affected the Court’s remedial decision.  
The Court noted the importance of the Sentencing Commission’s goals of 
uniformity and stated that the ability to match real conduct with the sen-
tence achieved this goal.
 
66  The Court reasoned that a system overly depen-
dant on plea-bargaining gave the prosecutor too much control.67  The Court 
stated that such prosecutorial discretion does not satisfy the Sentencing 
Commission goals of increasing uniformity.68  It also stated that the need to 
provide individualized sentences while maintaining consistency for similar 
conduct was critical to its decision.69
Additionally, the Booker Court emphasized the importance of § 3553(a) 
in sentencing decisions and the judge’s ability to tailor sentencing decisions 
based on factors listed within that statute.
 
70
                                                          
 61. Id. The text of § 3553(b)(1) reads in part: 
  The decision explicitly stated 
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the court shall impose a sentence of the kind, 
and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that 
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, 
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formu-
lating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described. 
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (West Supp. 2006) (emphasis added). 
  Section 3742(e) instructs appellate judges to apply de novo review to the sentencing 
court’s decision.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).  This standard was 
changed by the Supreme Court’s decision to require appellate review under a “reasonable-
ness” standard.  Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-61. 
 62. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 245-47. 
 66. Id. at 246. 
 67. Id. at 256-57. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 264. 
 70. Id. at 261.  Section 3553(a) states: 
Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.  The court shall impose a sen-
tence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set 
forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular 
sentence to be imposed, shall consider— 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics 
of the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
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that district courts are not bound by the Guidelines, although they must 
consult them.71  The Court instructed judges to consider the § 3553(a) fac-
tors when sentencing, such as the nature and circumstances of the offense 
and the history and characteristics of the defendant.72  This provision of the 
Guidelines requires judges to consider the main objectives of the Sentenc-
ing Commission; namely, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the 
history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need for the sentence to 
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.73
Further, Booker grants appellate review under a reasonableness stan-
dard.
 
74  The Court reasoned that such a standard is consistent with Con-
gress’ intentions and instructed appellate courts to assess whether the sen-
tence is unreasonable under the factors discussed in § 3553(a).75
PART II: JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND COOPERATION POST-BOOKER 
  Although 
lower courts are afforded greater discretion, this discretion will be affected 
by how appellate courts interpret reasonableness. 
A. Booker’s Impact on Substantial Assistance Departures 
Expanded judicial discretion has allowed judges to consider a greater 
number of factors when sentencing a defendant, including the defendant’s 
cooperation with the prosecution.  Judges may grant a sentence lower than 
the sentence suggested by the pre-sentence report, when reasonableness so 
requires.76
                                                                                                                                      
 
  Thus, a judge may diverge from the Guidelines based on coop-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, 
and to provide just punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; 
 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for— 
. . . 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with 
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and 
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West & Supp. 2004). 
 71. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46. 
 72. Id. at 249. 
 73. Id. at 268-69. 
 74. Id. at 261-62. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 260-62. 
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eration, even where the prosecutor has not filed a motion to grant the de-
fendant a substantial assistance departure under section 5K1.1, which was 
previously impossible under the mandatory sentencing regime.  This is 
mainly achieved by factoring either the defendant’s cooperation, or good 
faith effort to cooperate, into the § 3553(a) factors that the judge considers.  
 Despite the expanded discretion, the trial court must provide an explana-
tion of how it reached its sentencing decision.77  In United States v. Martin, 
the prosecution filed a section 5K1.1 substantial assistance motion, recom-
mending that the defendant receive a sentence of sixty-two months impri-
sonment.78  Instead of applying this sentence, the district court imposed a 
sentence of sixty months probation.79  No explanation was provided to es-
tablish the validity of such a significant departure.80  The appellate court 
vacated the sentence, reasoning that post-Booker, a sentencing court must 
provide some explanation for departing from the Guidelines.81  This expla-
nation is necessary to assess whether the sentence is reasonable and to al-
low for meaningful appellate review of the sentence.82  Thus, although trial 
courts have broad sentencing discretion, this discretion is not unfettered.83  
The sentencing judge must provide a reasonable basis for departre that is 
individualized to the defendant.84
Nonetheless, courts now have increased discretion to reduce a defen-
dant’s sentence when reasonableness so requires.  In United States v. Piza-
no, the prosecution submitted a section 5K1.1 motion suggesting that the 
court give Pizano a ten percent reduction in his sentence.
 
85  When the trial 
court sentenced Pizano to a term seventy-five percent below his Guidelines 
range,86 the prosecution appealed and argued that the sentence was unrea-
sonable.87  The Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s sentence, noting 
that the trial judge evaluated the § 3553(a) factors related to Pizano’s coop-
eration, such as the usefulness and significance of the assistance given, and 
stated his reasons for implementing a departure.88
                                                          
 77. United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 2005) (“This consultation 
requirement, at a minimum, obliges the district court to calculate correctly the sentencing 
range prescribed by the Guidelines . . . .”). 
  The appellate court also 
 78. 135 F. App’x 411, 412 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 79. Id. at 414. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 415-16. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 416. 
 84. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-62 (2005). 
 85. 403 F.3d 991, 993 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 86. Id. at 994. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 996-97. 
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suggested that while serious consideration should be given to the prosecu-
tor’s sentencing recommendation, the sentencing judge is not controlled by 
it.89
Post-Booker courts may consider a lower sentence for substantial assis-
tance against the government’s opposition.
 
90  In United States v. Beamon, 
the district court evaluated § 3553(a) in view of the nature of the offense, 
the character of the defendant, and the needs of the public when sentencing 
the defendant.91  In addition, the court considered the disparate impact of 
crack-cocaine sentences and powder-cocaine sentences.92  The court deter-
mined that in sentencing it could consider factors that relate to the defen-
dant’s substantial assistance, as well as factors that are not related.93  Fur-
thermore, in United States v. Condon, the district court upheld its own 
decision to give the defendant a sentencing departure that exceeded the 
government’s recommendation.94  The court noted that it had considered 
the factors under § 3553(a) and could elect to give a greater departure based 
on Condon’s cooperation.95
Even where there is no government motion to grant a substantial assis-
tance departure, the judge may consider the offender’s cooperation, or good 
faith effort to cooperate with the prosecution, in accordance with § 
3553(a).
 
96  As previously discussed, § 3553(a) has increased importance in 
the post-Booker sentencing world.97  Booker authorizes judges to use § 
3553(a) as a vehicle to sentence consistently with the statutory provisions 
of the Guidelines.98  The § 3553(a) provision is crucial because it considers 
important offender characteristics and traits, which are relevant to sentenc-
ing.99
The § 3553(a) provision is increasingly important for cooperation be-
cause, despite Booker’s expansion of judicial discretion, courts have not 
incorporated this discretion under the section 5K1.1 provision of the Guide-
lines.  Several cases have held that because section 5K1.1 requires a gov-
 
                                                          
 89. Id. at 996. 
 90. See, e.g., United States v. Beamon, 373 F. Supp. 2d 878, 885-86 (E.D. Wis. 2005); 
United States v. Condon, Nos. C3-05-04, C3-05-05, 2005 WL 1114841, at *1 (D.N.D. Apr. 
22, 2005). 
 91. Beamon, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 885-86. 
 92. Id. at 886. 
 93. Id. at 884. 
 94. Condon, 2005 WL 1114841, at *1.  The government recommended a sentence of 
forty-eight months and the court imposed a sentence of forty-two months.  Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 97. See supra text accompanying notes 76-95. 
 98. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005). 
 99. See supra note 70, providing the relevant text of § 3553(a). 
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ernment motion to depart, it is per se unreasonable for a court to depart in 
the absence of such a motion.100  Despite this limitation, judges may con-
sider a defendant’s cooperation or good faith effort to cooperate through 
the lens of § 3553(a).101  A defendant who has surrendered all available in-
formation in a timely manner may present a decreased likelihood of reci-
divism.102  Where a defendant has eliminated ties to a criminal organiza-
tion, her ability to return is necessarily impaired.103  This is especially so 
where she has revealed all available information to the prosecution.104  This 
type of behavior is at the heart of the offender characteristics described in § 
3553(a).105
B. Compliance With the Guidelines As a Measure of Reasonableness: 
The Reluctance to Require Courts to Diverge From the Guidelines 
  Thus, so long as the court evaluates cooperation through § 
3553(a) to impose a reasonable and individualized sentence, appellate 
courts should uphold the trial court’s sentencing decision. 
Booker does not require courts to reduce a sentence based on a defen-
dant’s substantial assistance.  Although judges have greater discretion to 
consider various factors post-Booker, sentences must comport with a rea-
sonableness standard.106  Many courts have interpreted reasonableness by 
measuring the sentencing court’s compliance with the Guidelines.  For in-
stance, where there is no section 5K1.1 substantial assistance motion by the 
prosecution, some courts have held that judges are not permitted to consid-
er the offender’s substantial assistance as a basis for reducing a sentence.107
When considering a defendant’s substantial assistance, courts are re-
stricted to giving sentences that are “reasonable.”
 
108  In United States v. 
Bermúdez, the defendant appealed the trial court’s failure to compel the 
government to file a section 5K1.1 motion on his behalf.109
                                                          
 100. See, e.g., 
  The trial court 
found that Bermúdez did not provide truthful information to the prosecu-
United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 101. See BARON-EVANS, supra note 17, at 17. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Section 3553(a) states that “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the his-
tory and characteristics of the defendant” are primary factors to be weighed when imposing 
a sentence.  18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West & Supp. 2004).  The characteristics of the defen-
dant are clearly implicated in cooperation or a good faith effort to cooperate with the gov-
ernment. 
 106. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005) (holding that sentencing deci-
sions should be evaluated for their reasonableness). 
 107. See, e.g., United States v. Bermúdez, 407 F.3d 536, 538 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 108. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 109. Bermúdez, 407 F.3d at 538. 
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tion.110  The appellate court reasoned that in light of this finding, the trial 
court was not required to grant a substantial assistance departure.111  The 
sentence must comport with reasonableness; refusing to depart from the 
Guidelines due to the defendant’s false testimony comports with reasona-
bleness.112
When sentences diverge from the Guidelines, appellate courts have re-
quired trial courts to provide an explanation for the divergence.  In United 
States v. Dalton, the Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court’s sentence, stat-
ing that it was unreasonable.
 
113  The prosecutor made a section 5K1.1 sub-
stantial assistance motion and suggested that Dalton receive a ten percent 
departure from the Guidelines.114  Instead, the trial court judge imposed a 
seventy-five percent departure and expressed his disdain toward the Guide-
lines.115  The appellate court reversed the sentence because the judge failed 
to state reasons why he placed greater weight on Dalton’s substantial assis-
tance than the prosecutor.116  Furthermore, the court found “[a]n extraordi-
nary reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances.”117
Moreover, defendants cannot compel the sentencing court to diverge 
from the Guidelines.  In United States v. Daniels, the defendant appealed 
the trial court’s sentencing decision, claiming that the court failed to com-
pel the government to file a substantial assistance motion.
 
118  The appellate 
court affirmed the trial court’s sentence, noting that the trial court cannot 
compel the government to make a section 5K1.1 motion where failure to do 
so is not unconstitutionally motivated.119  Furthermore, the appellate court 
noted that the trial court considered Daniels’s cooperation with the gov-
ernment in its sentencing decision.120  Because the trial court considered 
the extent of Daniels’s cooperation in its decision, the sentence could not 
be unreasonable.121
Furthermore, a sentencing court does not have the authority to force the 
prosecution to make a section 5K1.1 substantial assistance motion on a de-
 
                                                          
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 541. 
 112. Id. 
 113. 404 F.3d 1029, 1033-34 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 114. Id. at 1029-30. 
 115. Id. at 1031-32. 
 116. Id. at 1033-34. 
 117. Id. at 1033. 
 118. 147 F. App’x 869, 870 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 502 (2006) 
(unpublished opinion). 
 119. Id. at 871. 
 120. Id. at 870. 
 121. Id. 
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fendant’s behalf.122  In United States v. Mullins, Mullins argued that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion when it did not compel the govern-
ment to make a section 5K1.1 substantial assistance motion.123  The appel-
late court affirmed the trial court’s sentence, reasoning that the government 
owes no duty to move for a section 5K1.1 sentencing departure,124 nor can 
the sentencing court compel the government to do so where the govern-
ment’s refusal is not unconstitutionally based.125  Similarly, in United 
States v. Moore, the court reasoned that section 5K1.1 fell within the sole 
discretion of the prosecutor,126 and although the prosecutor had the right to 
make a section 5K1.1 motion, she had no duty to do so.127
In sum, trial courts are not compelled to diverge from the Guidelines 
where there is no motion from the prosecution.  These cases illustrate that 
in fact, many appellate courts have interpreted reasonableness in relation to 
compliance with the Guidelines.  Under section 5K1.1, the Guidelines re-
quire that the prosecution make a motion for substantial assistance before a 
judge departs.  Thus, these courts have rejected the possibility that district 
judges may grant a section 5K1.1 departure in the absence of such a mo-
tion.  Measuring reasonableness in such a manner does not appear war-
ranted under the Booker decision, which states that sentences should be 
viewed in light of the factors described in § 3553(a), not in terms of how 
the sentence conforms with the Guidelines. 
 
Further, appellate courts have not applied this stringent interpretation of 
“reasonableness” across the board.  Recent case law suggests that appellate 
courts are more likely to affirm a divergence from the Guidelines where the 
district court grants a higher sentence to the defendant than where the dis-
                                                          
 122. Id.  A court can only compel the government motion if the government acted un-
constitutionally, such as discriminating on the basis of race.  Id. 
 123. 399 F.3d 888, 889 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 124. Id. at 890.  Note that this case does not address whether a district court can grant a 
section 5K1.1 departure in the absence of a government motion.  Although many cases state 
in dicta that the grant of a section 5K1.1 departure is solely at the discretion of the prosecu-
tor, all of these cases cite pre-Booker case law outlining the procedure of section 5K1.1 mo-
tions.  See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  None of these cases, however, address 
how Booker implicates the section 5K1.1 departure provision in light of expanded judicial 
discretion.  Furthermore, none of these cases offer any analysis or rationale for claiming that 
section 5K1.1 motions are granted at the sole discretion of the prosecutor, outside of the ci-
tation of pre-Booker case law.  Arguably, much of the pre-Booker case law is partially irre-
levant and courts should attempt to revisit this concept, or at the very least, provide a ratio-
nale for their assumption that sentencing courts cannot grant section 5K1.1 departures in the 
absence of a government motion. 
 125. Mullins, 399 F.3d at 890. 
 126. 136 F. App’x 284, 287 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Because substantial-assistance motions are 
within the government’s discretion, a defendant has no protected right which gives rise to a 
due process claim.”). 
 127. Id. at 286 (citing Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 184 (1992)). 
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trict court grants a lower sentence.128
C. Procedural and Utilitarian Arguments to Restrict Judicial 
Discretion 
  If appellate courts apply a standard of 
reasonableness with teeth for pro-defendant sentences, they should not ap-
ply a “reasonableness lite” standard for pro-prosecution sentences. 
Despite Booker’s expansion of judicial discretion, there are some argu-
ments for limiting a court’s ability to consider cooperation.  One argument 
follows a utilitarian analysis.129  According to this argument, cooperation 
plays a purely functional role in sentencing by furthering the prosecutorial 
enterprise.130  This approach does not consider the culpability of the defen-
dant or the defendant’s offender characteristics.131  Another argument is a 
procedural argument.132  Under this argument, because section 5K1.1 re-
quires prosecutors to move for a section 5K1.1 motion, judges may not 
grant a section 5K1.1 departure in the absence of a prosecutorial request to 
do so.133
Several scholars argue that the substantial assistance provision should 
not consider the culpability of the defendant.
  This is the more persuasive of the two arguments because it is 
based on the actual text of the section 5K1.1 provision. 
134  According to this view, the 
purpose of the section 5K1.1 provision is strictly utilitarian, and the actual 
receipt of substantial assistance from the defendant should be the only con-
sideration for departure.135  Proponents of this view argue that the section 
5K1.1 provision is most efficient when it provides departures to defendants 
who may actually provide usable information to the prosecution.136
Utilitarians argue that section 5K1.1 departures are efficient because ac-
tually receiving substantial assistance is economically beneficial for prose-
 
                                                          
 128. See supra note 16. 
 129. See generally Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining 
Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043 (2001); Aa-
ron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical Premises of the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557 (2003). 
 130. See Bowman & Heise, supra note 129 at 1117.  A utilitarian approach only consid-
ers the direct benefit to the prosecution, considering whether the prosecutor was able to 
prosecute other individuals based on the information that was provided by the defendant. 
 131. See, e.g., id. at 1117 (“Implicit in the idea of substantiality is . . . proof that the assis-
tance materially advanced the prosecutorial enterprise.”). 
131.See, e.g., id. at 1117 (“Implicit in the idea of substantiality is . . . proof that the assis-
tance materially advanced the prosecutorial enterprise.”). 
 132. See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005).  But see 
supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 133. See Crawford, 407 F.3d at 1182. 
 134. See generally sources cited supra note 129. 
 135. See Bowman & Heise, supra note 129, at 1117. 
 136. Id. 
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cutors in their investigations.137  Accordingly, the substantial assistance de-
parture is only a tool for law enforcement, designed to provide an incentive 
for defendants to cooperate; culpability is largely irrelevant.138  Under this 
view, substantial assistance departures exist based on the “hardheaded utili-
tarian calculation that offering sentence reductions . . . for [cooperation] is 
sometimes necessary to successfully prosecute certain crimes.”139  Substan-
tial assistance departures are only efficient when given to defendants who 
actually provide substantial assistance to law enforcement.140  Thus, a good 
faith effort to provide substantial assistance should be ignored because the 
prosecution did not actually profit from the information.141
Another position against granting section 5K1.1 departures in the ab-
sence of a government motion argues that the court is procedurally barred 
from doing so.
  According to 
this argument, prosecutors only benefit where the cooperation is “substan-
tial,” by assisting in the apprehension of other criminals and obtaining 
more prosecutions. 
142  According to this argument, the court is only allowed to 
grant a substantial assistance departure if the government makes a section 
5K1.1 motion.143
One of the most-cited cases to support the contention that the district 
court can only consider substantial assistance after the government has 
made a section 5K1.1 motion is United States v. Wade.
 
144  The Wade Court 
held that the section 5K1.1 provision gives the government power to file a 
substantial assistance motion, but it does not create a duty to do so.145  The 
prosecutor’s discretion in filing a section 5K1.1 substantial assistance mo-
tion is subject only to constitutional limitations.146  In United States v. Ala-
min, the court stated that a judge may not grant a section 5K1.1 departure 
without the government motion.147
Both Alamin and Wade pre-date Booker, but relying on these cases, 
many post-Booker courts have simply concluded that judges may not grant 
 
                                                          
 137. See generally Rappaport, supra note 129. 
 138. Id. at 574. 
 139. Bowman & Heise, supra note 129, at 1117. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 143. Id. 
 144. 504 U.S. 181, 182-83 (1992). 
 145. Id. at 185. 
 146. Id. at 185-87. 
 147. 895 F.2d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that the Sentencing Guidelines make it 
clear that there can be no section 5K1.1 departure without a motion by the government). 
147.895 F.2d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that the Sentencing Guidelines make it 
clear that there can be no section 5K1.1 departure without a motion by the government). 
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a section 5K1.1 substantial assistance departure without a government mo-
tion.148  Courts either summarily conclude that Booker has no impact on the 
judge’s ability to grant section 5K1.1 departures,149 or decide to address the 
issue.150
PART III: RECOMMENDATION 
  Courts are reading the Sentencing Guidelines too restrictively and 
have failed to reconsider their views on this contention in light of Booker.  
These cases may be irrelevant given the courts’ shift toward increased judi-
cial discretion post-Booker.  As such, these arguments do not properly ad-
dress how Booker has impacted cooperation sentence variances. 
A. Acknowledging Good Faith Efforts to Cooperate 
Despite the utilitarian and procedural arguments, judges should factor an 
offender’s good faith effort to cooperate into their sentencing decisions, 
even where no government motion exists.  First, the utilitarian goals of the 
Guidelines can be satisfied by considering a defendant’s good faith effort to 
cooperate with the government, because such consideration encourages co-
operation.  In addition, considering a defendant’s cooperation in the ab-
sence of a section 5K1.1 motion allows the court to grant sentences that are 
reasonable and individualized to the defendant, a goal the Supreme Court 
realized as material in Booker.151
Second, granting variances to those who make a good faith effort to 
cooperate is efficient because it may increase the number of offers of sub-
stantial assistance.
  Appellate courts should grant great defe-
rence to the sentencing courts because sentencing courts are better able to 
assess the relevant § 3553(a) factors, which are fact-intensive inquiries 
about the offender.  Appellate courts have been applying a standard of rea-
sonableness that relies too heavily on the Guidelines without considering 
the importance of the factors discussed in § 3553(a). 
152
                                                          
 148. See, e.g., 
  This, in turn, will most likely increase the amount of 
United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1181-83 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 398 F.3d 1254, 1260 n.7 (10th Cir. 2005).  Some 
courts dodge attempts to reconcile the prosecutorial discretion in filing section 5K1.1 mo-
tions and the court’s discretion to consider a defendant’s cooperation.  Id. 
 151. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005) (discussing the importance of 
giving individualized sentences and its relationship to the Sentencing Commission’s goals). 
 152. Increasing the number of offers of substantial assistance is critical because section 
5K1.1 motions were intended to be used frequently.  See Bruce M. Selya & John C. Massa-
ro, The Illustrative Role of Substantial Assistance Departures in Combating Ultra-
Uniformity, 35 B.C. L. REV. 799, 810 (1994) (noting that section 5K1.1 is an incentive pro-
gram, and, “like other incentives, [it] was conceived out of a desire to maximize the occur-
rence of its operative condition (i.e., cooperation with law enforcement authorities) and, as a 
necessary corollary, to maximize the number of times the section would be invoked”). 
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substantial assistance actually provided.  The section 5K1.1 provision was 
intended to be invoked as frequently as possible and was created to in-
crease the occurrence of cooperation for the government.153
Moreover, refusing to consider the good faith effort to cooperate made 
by minor players creates “an inverted pyramid with stiff sentences for mi-
nor players and modest punishments for knowledgeable insiders who can 
cut favorable deals.”
  Allowing de-
partures only where substantial assistance is actually provided may, how-
ever, have the opposite effect by discouraging lower-ranked members of an 
organization from cooperating when they have useful information, because 
they fear that the prosecutor will not deem their information “substantial.” 
154  A good faith effort to cooperate should be consi-
dered because to do otherwise would reward the defendants who are most 
culpable.155
Furthermore, a good faith effort to cooperate reveals something about 
the character of the defendant.  Making a good faith effort to cooperate 
may involve endangering oneself, being scrutinized by members of a crim-
inal organization, severing all criminal ties, and goes beyond merely ac-
cepting responsibility for one’s action.  It frequently involves placing one-
self in harm’s way.  Judges should consider it along with other offender 
characteristics.
 
156  A character-based analysis is most relevant to this issue.  
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the Guidelines Manual, and recent 
Supreme Court case law support a character-based approach to criminal 
sentencing.157
                                                          
 153. See id. 
  The character-based approach highlights the offender’s cha-
 154. See Schulhofer, supra note 22, at 212-13 (arguing that the section 5K1.1 requirement 
for “actual” substantial assistance creates a cooperation paradox that rewards the most culp-
able offenders).  But see Frank O. Bowman, III, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of 
Judicial Revolt on “Substantial Assistance” Departures Follows a Decade of Prosecutorial 
Indiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REV. 7, 53 (1999) (arguing that the claim of “reverse equity” is 
overstated). 
 155. See Schulhofer, supra note 22, at 212-13. 
 156. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  A good faith effort demonstrates the de-
fendant’s willingness to cooperate with law enforcement and exemplifies a trait greater than 
mere acceptance of responsibility.  The defendant not only accepts responsibility but also 
sacrifices any past relationship she had with her criminal connections.  A good faith effort to 
cooperate is not a mere desire to do so but the actual actions taken in furtherance of provid-
ing cooperation to the government, including providing the limited information she may 
have. 
 157. See generally, Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C.); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL (2005); see, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 
(1996)(noting that “[i]t has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the 
sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a 
unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime 
and the punishment to ensue”).  Furthermore, Koon instructed sentencing courts to “make a 
refined assessment of the many facts that bear on the outcome, informed by its vantage point 
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racteristics, history, and likelihood of recidivism.158
Congress instructed federal districts to closely examine “the nature and 
the circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant.”
 
159  According to the commission, the court may also consider, 
“without limitation, any information concerning the background, character 
and conduct of the defendant.”160  A character-based approach encom-
passes all of the aforementioned objectives of the Sentencing Commission 
and would be the most appropriate method of analyzing cooperation.161  
“[T]he character-based approach permits the sentencing judge to fully ex-
amine ‘the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the 
crime and punishment to ensue.’”162  This allowance contributes to the ho-
listic approach to sentencing as originally intended by Congress.163
A character-based approach encourages judges to consider cooperation 
and how it relates to offender characteristics.
 
164  Applying this approach, a 
good faith effort to cooperate made by a lower member of an illicit organi-
zation should be one of the offender characteristics that judges consider 
when sentencing a defendant.165  One’s good faith effort to provide sub-
stantial assistance “should be weighed against the criminal culpability, mi-
tigating the offender’s punishment.”166  It is greater than accepting respon-
sibility because the defendant is now cutting off all ties from her past 
criminal activity.  By attempting to cooperate and offer what information 
she may have, a defendant often places herself in danger and destroys ties 
with the illicit underground organization to which she once belonged.167
                                                                                                                                      
and day-to-day sentencing experience.”  Koon, 518 U.S. at 82.  Only a character-based ap-
proach reaches such breadth of analysis.  See also Rachael A. Hill, Comment, Character, 
Choice, and “Aberrant Behavior”: Aligning Criminal Sentencing with Concepts of Moral 
Blame, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 975 (1998); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Con-
ceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 
  
This willingness is an offender characteristic that judges should consider 
when granting sentencing departures because it relates directly to the objec-
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 369 (1996) (recognizing “a 
long moral and legal tradition” that holds “that we owe it to the dignity and humanity of the 
defendant to let the entire history appear”). 
 158. NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY 
VALUES 67 (Tim Crane & Jonathan Wolff eds., 1994).  Character-based analysis serves as a 
“practical orientation of the criminal law as a form of social control . . . .  [It upholds], per-
haps symbolically, certain framework social values.”  Id. 
 159. Hill, supra note 157, at 982 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)). 
 160. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.4 (1997)). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 983 (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)). 
 163. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 250 (2005). 
 164. See Rappaport, supra note 129, at 575. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text. 
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tives of § 3553(a).168
B. Consideration of Cooperation Where There is No Government 
Motion 
  Judges should use § 3553(a) as a basis for reducing 
the sentences of offenders who provide a good faith effort to cooperate, 
where reasonableness so requires. 
Judges should also be able to evaluate a defendant’s cooperation under 
section 5K1.1, even where there is no government motion.  Analysis under 
section 5K1.1 is appropriate where the defendant has provided assistance to 
the prosecution, but for some reason, the government did not file a section 
5K1.1 motion on behalf of the defendant.  Although § 3553(a) provides an 
outlet for discussing this type of cooperation, section 5K1.1 is the tradition-
al method of evaluating substantial assistance.169  The absence of a gov-
ernment motion should not circumvent a judge’s ability to use the provision 
most appropriate for cooperation.  Booker suggested that judges tailor de-
fendant sentences.170  Inability to analyze cooperation under the provision 
designated for cooperation hinders this goal.  Furthermore, no courts have 
provided an adequate reason for why judges should not be able to use sec-
tion 5K1.1 as a method of analyzing cooperation in the absence of a gov-
ernment motion.171
C. General Recommendations 
 
Appellate courts should give great factual deference to the sentencing 
courts.  Although appellate courts must review the sentencing court’s deci-
sion with a standard of reasonableness,172 they must also defer to the sen-
tencing courts’s factual findings.173  The trial court can better interpret the 
relevant factual considerations and individualize the defendant’s sen-
tence.174
                                                          
 168. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. 
  They also have direct access to the facts and are better able to 
analyze the offender’s likelihood of recidivism.  For this reason, several 
 169. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra Part I.B. 
 173. United States v. Veteto, 920 F.2d 823, 825 (11th Cir. 1991). 
 174. Id. at 825; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (West 2003 & Supp. 2004). Although the 
§ 3742(e) provision has been struck down by Booker, it offers valuable insight into the 
weight that the Sentencing Commission intended to place on the sentencing court’s findings.  
This provision states, “The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the 
district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses . . . [and] shall give due deference to 
the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.”  18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e). 
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appellate courts have deferred to the trial court’s sentencing decision.175
One case that highlights the desire to rely on the trial court’s sentencing 
and factual findings is United States v. Veteto.
 
176  In this case, the trial court 
sentenced Veteto as a career offender.177  Veteto argued that his two pre-
vious convictions were part of the same crime, and he was therefore not a 
career offender.178  Because the inquiry into whether the crimes were sepa-
rate or related was fact-intensive, however, the appellate court deferred to 
the trial court’s initial findings and applied a “clearly erroneous” stan-
dard.179  The appellate court held that it was within the trial court’s discre-
tion to sentence Veteto to a sentence higher than that laid out in the Sen-
tencing Guidelines recommendation because great deference should be 
given to the sentencing court due to the case’s highly fact-intensive in-
quiry.180
The trend to reverse decisions where the judge issued a sentence lower 
than what was recommended in the Guidelines, even after considering the 
factors in § 3553(a), does not follow the precedent that the Supreme Court 
established with Booker.  For instance, in United States v. Desselle,
 
181 after 
granting a downward departure that was greater than the sentence recom-
mended by the prosecution, the sentencing judge stated that in doing so he 
had considered the age of the defendant and the likelihood of recidivism, 
which are two characteristics that fit within the ambit of § 3553(a).182  De-
spite this, the Fifth Circuit reversed the sentence, claiming that the sentenc-
ing judge did not evaluate the factors within section 5K1.1.183  This was the 
basis of reversal even though district court judges were instructed through 
Booker to consider the factors within § 3553(a) to fashion the appropriate 
sentence.  The Fifth Circuit relied on the text of the Guidelines without dis-
cussing the effect of Booker on the computation of sentences.184  The Su-
preme Court emphasized the importance of evaluating the factors under § 
3553(a) for all sentences, yet the Fifth Circuit only emphasized the text of 
the 5K1.1 provision when reversing the sentence.185
                                                          
 175. See, e.g., Veteto, 920 F.2d at 825. 
  This is an example of 
an appellate court reaching too far to prevent a downward departure from 
 176. Id. at 826. 
 177. Id. at 824. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 825. 
 180. Id. 
 181. 450 F.3d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 182. Id. at 181-82. 
 183. Id. at 183 (finding that the district court abused its discretion by considering non-
assistance-related factors in determining the extent of section 5K1.1). 
 184. Id. at 182. 
 185. Id. at 182-83. 
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the Guidelines. 
Trial courts should be able to exercise their discretion to consider the of-
fender’s cooperation, even where defendants make a good faith effort to 
cooperate but their cooperation has not yielded substantial assistance.  As-
suming that a court cannot grant a section 5K1.1 departure in the absence 
of a government motion, courts may still factor in cooperation when re-
viewing the § 3553(a) factors.  Booker recognized the importance of indi-
vidualized sentences that consider the defendant’s level of culpability and 
character traits.  As such, cooperation and a good faith effort to cooperate 
reveal important characteristics, such as likelihood of recidivism, that 
courts should be able to consider in this era of expanded judicial sentencing 
discretion. 
 
